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ABSTRACT
Motivated by the recent cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid,
we study cyber attacks on power grids that affect both the physical
infrastructure and the data at the control center. In particular, we
assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) remotely discon-
necting some lines within the attacked area, and (ii) modifying
the information received from the attacked area to mask the line
failures and hide the attacked area from the control center. For the
latter, we consider two types of attacks: (i) data distortion: which
distorts the data by adding powerful noise to the actual data, and
(ii) data replay: which replays a locally consistent old data instead
of the actual data. We use the DC power flow model and prove
that the problem of finding the set of line failures given the phase
angles of the nodes outside of the attacked area is strongly NP-hard,
even when the attacked area is known. However, we introduce
the polynomial time REcurrent Attack Containment and deTection
(REACT) Algorithm to approximately detect the attacked area and
line failures after a cyber attack. We numerically show that it per-
forms very well in detecting the attacked area, and detecting single,
double, and triple line failures in small and large attacked areas.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to their complexity and magnitude, modern infrastructure net-
works need to be monitored and controlled using computer systems.
These computer systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks [1]. One
of the most important infrastructure networks that is vulnerable to
cyber attacks is the power grid which is monitored and controlled
by the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
In a recent cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid [3], the
attackers stole credentials for accessing the SCADA system and
used it to cause a large scale blackout affecting hundred thousands
of people. In particular, they simultaneously operated several of
the circuit breakers in the grid and jammed the phone lines to keep
the system operators unaware of the situation [3].
Motivated by the Ukraine event, in this paper, we deploy the DC
power flow model and study a model of a cyber attack on the power
grid that affects both the physical infrastructure and the data at the
control center. As illustrated in Fig. 1, we assume that an adversary
attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some lines within the attacked
area (by remotely activating the circuit breakers), and (ii) modifying
the information (phase angles of the nodes and status of the lines)
received from the attacked area to mask the line failures and hide
the attacked area from the control center. For the latter, we consider
two types of attacks: (i) data distortion: which distorts the data
𝐻
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Figure 1: The attack model. An adversary attacks an area H
which is unknown to the control center (represented by red
nodes) by disconnecting some lines within the attacked area
(shown by red dashed lines) and modifying the information
received from the attacked area tomask the line failures and
hide the attacked area from the control center.
by adding powerful noise to the data received from the attacked
area, and (ii) data replay: which replays a locally consistent old data
instead of the actual data.
We prove that the problem of finding the set of line failures
given the phase angles of the nodes outside of the attacked area
is strongly NP-hard, even when the attacked area is known. Hence,
one cannot expect to develop a polynomial time algorithm that can
exactly detect the attacked area and recover the information for all
possible attack scenarios. However, we introduce the polynomial
time REcurrent Attack Containment and deTection (REACT) Algo-
rithm and numerically show that it performs very well in reasonable
scenarios.
In particular, we first introduce the ATtacked Area Containment
(ATAC) Module for approximately detecting the attacked area using
graph theory and the algebraic properties of the DC power flow
equations. We show that the ATAC Module can always provide an
area containing the attacked area after a data distortion or a data
replay attack. We further provide tools to improve the accuracy of
the approximated attacked areas obtained by the ATAC Module
under different data attack types.
Then, we introduce the randomized LIne Failures Detection
(LIFD) Module to detect the line failures and recover the phase
angles inside the detected attacked area. The LIFD Module builds
upon the methods first introduced in [30], to detect line failures
using Linear Programming (LP) in more general cases. In particular,
we prove that in some cases that the methods in [30] fail to detect
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line failures, the LIFD Module can successfully detect line failures
in expected polynomial running time.
Finally, the REACT Algorithm combines the ATAC and LIFD
Modules to provide a comprehensive algorithm for attacked area
detection and information recovery following a cyber attack. We
evaluate the performance of the REACT Algorithm by considering
two attacked areas, one with 15 nodes and the other one with 31
nodes within the IEEE 300-bus system [2]. We show that when the
attacked area is small, the REACT Algorithm performs equally well
after the data distortion and the data replay attacks. In particular, it
can exactly detect the attacked area in all the cases, and accurately
detect single, double, and triple line failures within the attacked
area in more than 80% of the cases.
When the attacked area is large, however, the REACT Algo-
rithm’s performance is different after the data distortion and the
data replay attacks. It still performs very well in detecting the at-
tacked area after a data distortion attack and accurately detects line
failures after single, double, and triple line failures in more than 60%
of the cases. However, it may face difficulties providing an accurate
approximation of the attacked area after a replay attack. Despite
these difficulties in approximating the attacked area, it accurately
detects single and double line failures in around 98% and 60% of
the cases, respectively.
The main contributions of this paper are two folds: (i) analyzing
the computational complexity of the attacked area detection and
information recovery problem after a cyber attack on the grid, and
(ii) introducing a polynomial time algorithm to address this problem
and numerically evaluating its performance. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop recovery algorithms for
the attacks in which the data from the area is modified and therefore
the attacked area in unknown.
2 RELATEDWORK
The vulnerability of general networks to attacks was thoroughly
studied in the past (e.g., [4, 20, 28] and references therein). In par-
ticular, [10, 34] studied a problem similar to the one studied in this
paper (failure detection from partial observations) in the context of
communication networks.
Vulnerability of power grids to failures and attacks was exten-
sively studied [7, 8, 13, 19, 23, 27, 29, 30]. In particular false data
injection attacks on power grids and anomaly detection were stud-
ied using the DC power flows in [11, 17, 18, 21, 24, 35]. These studies
focused on the observability of the failures and attacks in the grid.
The problem studied in this paper is related to the problem of
line failures detection using phase angle measurements [14, 30,
32, 33, 39]. Up to two line failures detection, under the DC power
flow model, was studied in [32, 33]. Since the methods developed
in [32, 33] are greedy-based that need to search the entire failure
space, their the running time grows exponentially as the number
of failures increases. Hence, these methods cannot be generalized
to detect higher order failures. Similar greedy approaches with
likelihood detection functions were studied in [16, 26, 37, 38, 40]
to address the PMU placement problem under the DC power flow
model.
The problem of line failures detection in an internal system
using the information from an external system was also studied
in [39] based on the DC power flow model. The proposed algorithm
works for only one and two line failures, since it depends on the
sparsity of line failures. In a recent work [14], a linear multinomial
regression model was proposed as a classifier for a single line failure
detection using transient voltage phase angles data. Due to the time
complexity of the learning process for multiple line failures, this
method is impractical for detecting higher order failures.
In [30], attack scenarios similar to the one in this paper was
studied. However, [30] only focused on the attacks that blocked
the information from the attacked area, and therefore, the attacked
area was detectable simply by checking the missing data. In this
work, we build upon the results of [30] to detect line failures in
more general data attack cases than the ones considered in [30]. In
a recent work [31], the methods provided in [30] were extended to
function under the AC power flow model.
Finally, in a recent series of works, the vulnerability of power
grids to undetectable cyber-physical attacks is studied [12, 22, 36]
using the DC power flows. These studies are mainly focused on
designing attacks that affect the entire grid and therefore may be
impossible to detect.
3 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 DC Power Flow Model
We adopt the linearized DC power flowmodel, which is widely used
as an approximation for the non-linear AC power flow model [6].
The notation is summarized in Table 1. In particular, we represent
the power grid by a connected undirected graphG = (V ,E) where
V = {1, 2, . . . ,n} and E = {e1, . . . , em } are the set of nodes and
edges corresponding to the buses and transmission lines, respec-
tively. Each edge ei is a set of two nodes ei = {u,v}. pv is the active
power supply (pv > 0) or demand (pv < 0) at node v ∈ V (for a
neutral node pv = 0). We assume pure reactive lines, implying that
each edge {u,v} ∈ E is characterized by its reactance ruv = rvu .
Given the power supply/demand vector ®p ∈ R |V |×1 and the
reactance values, a power flow is a solution P ∈ R |V |× |V | and
®θ ∈ R |V |×1 of:
∑
v ∈N (u)
puv = pu , ∀ u ∈ V (1)
θu − θv − ruvpuv = 0, ∀ {u,v} ∈ E (2)
where N (u) is the set of neighbors of node u, puv is the power
flow from node u to node v , and θu is the phase angle of node u.
Eq. (1) guarantees (classical) flow conservation and (2) captures the
dependency of the flow on the reactance values and phase angles.
Additionally, (2) implies that puv = −pvu . When the total supply
equals the total demand in each connected component of G, (1)-(2)
has a unique solution P and ®θ up to a shift (since shifting all θu s
by equal amounts does not violate (2)). Eqs.(1)-(2) are equivalent to
the following matrix equation:
A®θ = ®p (3)
2
Table 1: Summary of notation.
Notation Description
G = (V ,E) The graph representing the power grid
A Admittance matrix of G
®θ Vector of the phase angles of the nodes in G
®p Vector of power supply/demand values
H A subgraph of G representing the attacked area
F Set of failed edges due to an attack
D Incidence matrix of G
N (i) Set of neighbors of node i
N (S) Set of neighbors of subgraph S
int(S) Interior of the subgraph S
∂(S) Boundary of the subgraph S
cl(S) Closure of the subgraph S
⃝′ The actual value of ⃝ after an attack
⃝⋆ The observed value of ⃝ after an attack
⃝ The complement of ⃝
where A ∈ R |V |× |V | is the admittance matrix of G,1 defined as:
auv =

0 if u , v and {u,v} < E,
−1/ruv if u , v and {u,v} ∈ E,
−∑w ∈N (u) auw if u = v .
Note that in power grids nodes can be connected by multiple edges,
and therefore, if there are k multiple lines between nodes u and v ,
auv = −∑ki=1 1/ruvi . Once ®θ is computed, the flows, puv , can be
obtained from (2).
Notation. Throughout this paper we use bold uppercase characters
to denote matrices (e.g., A), italic uppercase characters to denote
sets (e.g., V ), and italic lowercase characters and overline arrow
to denote column vectors (e.g., ®θ ). For a matrix Q, Qi denotes its
ith row, and qi j denotes its (i, j)th entry. For a column vector ®y, ®yT
denote its transpose, yi denotes its ith entry, ∥ ®y∥1 := ∑ni=1 |yi | is
its l1-norm, and supp(®y) := {i |yi , 0} is its support.
3.2 Attack Model
We study a cyber attack on the power grid that affects both its
physical infrastructure and the data at its control center. We as-
sume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some
lines within the attacked area (by remotely activating the circuit
breakers), and (ii) modifying the information (phase angle of the
nodes and status of the lines) received from the attacked area to
mask the line failures and hide the attacked area from the control
center. We assume that supply/demand values do not change after
the attack and disconnecting lines within the attacked area does
not make G disconnected. However, the developed methods in this
paper can also be used when these conditions do not hold, if the
control center is aware of the changes in the supply/demand values
after the attack and in the case of the grid separation.
Fig. 1 shows an example of such an attack on the area represented
by H = (VH ,EH ). Due to the attack, some edges are disconnected
(we refer to these edges as failed lines) and the phase angles and the
status of the lines within the attacked area are modified. We denote
the set of failed lines in area H by F ⊆ EH . Upon failure, the failed
1The matrix A can also be considered as the weighted Laplacian matrix of the graph.
lines are removed from the graph and the flows are redistributed
according to (1)-(2). The objective is to detect the attacked area and
the failed lines after the attack using the observed phase angles.
The vectors of phase angle of the nodes in H and in its comple-
ment H¯ = G\H are denoted by ®θH and ®θH¯ , respectively. We use
the prime symbol (′) to denote the actual values after an attack.
For instance, G ′, A′, and ®θ ′ are used to represent the graph, the
admittance matrix of the graph, and the actual phase angles after
the attack. Based on our assumptions ®p = A®θ = A′ ®θ ′ = ®p ′.
We also use ®θ⋆ to denote the observed phase angles after the
attack. According to the attack model ®θ⋆H is modified and is not
necessarily equal to ®θ ′H . We assume that the attacker performs any
of the following two types of data attacks:
(1) Data distortion: We assume ®θ⋆H = ®θ ′H + ®z for a random
vector ®z with an arbitrary distribution with no positive prob-
ability mass in any proper linear subspace (e.g., multivariate
Gaussian distribution).
(2) Data replay: We assume ®θ⋆H = ®θ ′′H such that ®θ ′′ satisfies
A®θ ′′ = ®p ′′ for an arbitrary power supply/demand vector
®p ′′ such that ®p ′′H = ®pH . We assume that ®p ′′¯H is selected
generally enough and is only known to the attacker. ®p ′′ can
be considered as the vector of supply/demand values from
previous hours or days.
Notice that adversarial modification of the reported phase angles
in H is not in the scope of this paper and is an interesting problem
on its own.
Notation.Without loss of generality we assume that the indices
are such that VH = {1, 2, . . . , |VH |} and EH = {e1, e2, . . . , e |EH |}.
If X ,Y are two subgraphs of G , AX |Y and AVX |VY both denote the
submatrix of the admittance matrix of G with rows from VX and
columns from VY . For instance, A can be written in any of the
following forms,
A =
[
AH |H AH |H¯
AH¯ |H AH¯ |H¯
]
,A =
[
AG |H AG |H¯
]
,A =
[
AH |G
AH¯ |G
]
.
3.3 Graph Theoretical Terms
In this paper, we use some graph theoretical terms most of which
are borrowed from [9].
Subgraphs: Let X be a subset of the nodes of a graph G. G[X ]
denotes the subgraph ofG induced byX . We denote the complement
of a set X by X¯ = V \X .
The neighbors, interior, boundary, and closure of a subgraph S
are defined and denoted by N (S) := {i ∈ V \VS |∃j ∈ VS : i ∈ N (j)},
int(S) := {i ∈ VS |N (i) ⊆ VS }, ∂(S) := {i ∈ VS |N (i) ∩VS¯ , ∅}, and
cl(S) := VS ∪ N (S), respectively.
Incidence Matrix: Assign arbitrary directions to the edges of G.
The (node-edge) incidencematrix ofG is denoted byD ∈ {−1, 0, 1} |V |× |E |
and is defined as follows,
di j =

0 if ej is not incident to node i,
1 if ej is coming out of node i,
−1 if ej is going into node i .
When we use the incidence matrix, we assume an arbitrary ori-
entation for the edges unless we mention an specific orientation.
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DH ∈ {−1, 0, 1} |VH |× |EH | is the submatrix of D with rows fromVH
and columns from EH .
4 HARDNESS
Using the notation provided in the previous section, the problem
considered in this paper can be stated as follows: Given A, ®θ , and
®θ⋆, detect the attacked area H and the set of line failures F . In this
section, we study the computational complexity of this and related
problems. To study the computational complexity of this problem,
we consider a more general case of ®θ⋆H without any assumptions
on the type of the data attack.
First, we prove that the problem of finding the set of line failures
(F ) solely based on the given the phase angles of the nodes before
(®θ ) and after the attack (®θ ′) is NP-hard. We prove this by reduction
from the 3-partition problem.
Definition 4.1. Given a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , s3k } of 3k elements
and a bound B, such that
∑3k
i=1 si = kB and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k , B/4 <
si < B/2, the 3-partition problem is the problem of whether S can
be partitioned into k disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sk such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k ,∑
sj ∈Si sj = B (note that each Si must therefore contain exactly 3
elements from S).
Lemma 4.2 (Garey and Johnson[15]). The 3-partition problem
is strongly NP-complete.
Lemma 4.3. GivenA, ®θ , and ®θ ′, it is strongly NP-hard to determine
if there exists a set of line failures F such that A′ ®θ ′ = A®θ .
Proof. We reduce the 3-partition problem to this problem. As-
sume S is a given set as described in Def. 4.1, we form a bipartite
graph G = (V ,E) such that V = X ∪ Y , E = {{x ,y}|x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y },
X = {1, . . . ,k}, and Y = {k + 1, . . . , 4k}. For all edges in G, we set
the reactance values equal to 1. For each i ∈ X , we set pi = B and
for each j ∈ Y we set pj = −sj−k . Define the vector of phase angles
®θ as follows:
θi =
{
0 i ≤ k
−si−k/k i > k .
If A is the admittance matrix of G, it is easy to check that A®θ = ®p.
Now define ®θ ′ as follows:
θ ′i =
{
0 i ≤ k
−si−k i > k .
We prove that there exist a set of line failures F such that A′ ®θ ′ = ®p
if, and only if, there exists a solution to the 3-partition problem.
First, lets assume that there exist a solution to the 3-partition
problem such as S1, . . . , Sk . Set ES = {{i, j}|sj−k ∈ Si }. We show
that F = E\ES implies A′ ®θ ′ = ®p. Notice that F = E\ES means that
G ′ = (V ,ES ). Given the pi and the reactance values, it is easy to
check that the defined ®θ ′ satisfies the DC power flow equations (1)-
(2) in G ′. Hence, A′ ®θ ′ = ®p.
Now, lets assume there exist a set of line failures F such that
A′ ®θ ′ = ®p. Set ES = E\F and G ′ = (V ,ES ). Given the phase angles
®θ ′, it is easy to see that for any {i, j} ∈ ES , pi j = sj−k . This implies
that for j ∈ Y , at most one edge in ES is incident to j. On the
other hand, using (1), for any i ∈ X , ∑j ∈N (i)′ sj−k = B in which
by N (i)′ we mean the set of neighbors of node i in G ′. Given that
each node j ∈ Y is incident to at most one edge in ES , defining
Si = {sj−k |j ∈ N (i)′} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k gives a good solution to the
3-partition problem.
Hence, determining if there exist a set of line failures F is at least
as hard as determining if the 3-partition problem has a solution,
and therefore, it is an NP-hard problem in the strong sense. □
Corollary 4.4. Given A, ®θ , and ®θ ′, it is strongly NP-hard to find
the set of line failures F , even if such a set exists.
Proof. It is easy to see that if one can find a set of line failures F
with an algorithm, the output of that algorithm can be used here to
verify the correctness and existence of such a set as well. Therefore,
this problem is at least as hard as the existence problem. □
In Corollary 4.4, we proved that given the phase angle of the
nodes before and after the attack, it is NP-hard to detect the set of
line failures F . In the following lemma, we show that even if the
attack area H is known (since ®θ ′H is not given) the problem remains
NP-hard.
Lemma 4.5. Given A, ®θ ,H , and ®θ ′¯
H
, it is strongly NP-hard to deter-
mine if there exist a set of line failures F in H and a vector ®θ ′H , such
that A′ ®θ ′ = A®θ .
Proof. The idea of the proof is very similar to the proof of
Lemma 4.3. Again we reduce the 3-partition problem with a given
set S as described in Def. 4.1 to this problem. Consider sets X1 =
{1, . . . ,k}, X2 = {k + 1, . . . , 2k}, Y2 = {2k + 1, . . . , 5k}, Y1 = {5k +
1, . . . , 8k}. We form a bipartite graph G = (V ,E) such that V =
X1 ∪ X2 ∪ Y2 ∪ Y1 and E = {{i,k + i}|1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {{x ,y}|x ∈
X2,y ∈ Y2} ∪ {{j, j + 3k}|2k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 5k}. Notice that the defined
bipartite graph here is very similar to the one defined in the proof
of Lemma 4.3 except that here for each node inX2 andY2 there exist
a dummy node in X1 and Y1, accordingly, that is directly connected
to its counterpart. We set H = G[X2 ∪ Y2]. It is easy to see that
H has exactly the same topology as the graph G in the proof of
Lemma 4.3. Again for all edges in G, we set the reactance values
equal to 1. For each i ∈ X2 ∪ Y2 we set pi = 0, for each i ∈ X1,
we set pi = B, and for each j ∈ Y1 we set pj = −sj−5k . Define the
vector of phase angles ®θ as follows:
θi =

B 1 ≤ i ≤ k
0 k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k
−si−2k/k 2k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 5k
−si−5k/k − si−5k 5k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 8k
If A is the admittance matrix of G, it is easy to check that A®θ = ®p.
Now define ®θ ′ as follows:
θ ′i =

B 1 ≤ i ≤ k
0 k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k
−si−2k 2k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 5k
−2si−5k 5k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 8k
Now given ®θ ′¯
H
, since each node in H is connected to an exactly one
distinct node in H¯ , there exist a matching between the nodes in
4
H and H¯ that covers nodes in H and therefore from [30, Corollary
2], ®θ ′H will be determined uniquely. Hence, we can assume that ®θ ′
is given for all the nodes. Now we prove that there exist a set of
line failures F in H such that A′ ®θ ′ = ®p if, and only if, there exist
a solution to the 3-partition problem. Given the way we build the
graph G and since the set of failures should be in H , the rest of the
proof is exactly similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3. □
Corollary 4.6. Given A, ®θ ,H , and ®θ ′¯
H
, it is strongly NP-hard to
find the set of line failures F in H , even if such a set exists.
Finally, we prove that when the phase angles are modified (®θ⋆)
and therefore H is not known in advance, it is NP-hard to detect
H and F . We assume that the attacked area cannot contain more
than half of the nodes, otherwise this problem might have many
solutions.
Lemma 4.7. GivenA, ®θ , and ®θ⋆, it is strongly NP-hard to determine
if there exists a subgraph H0 with |VH0 | ≤ |V |/2, a set of line failures
F in H0, and a vector ®θ ′H0 such that A®θ = A′
[ ®θ ′H0
®θ⋆
H¯0
]
.
Proof. Again we reduce the 3-partition partition problem to
this problem. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.5. Given
an instance of a 3-partition problem, we build a graph G, subgraph
H , and supply and demand vector ®p exactly as in the proof of
Lemma 4.5. Define ®θ⋆
H¯
= ®θ ′¯
H
as defined in Lemma 4.5 and ®θ⋆H = ®z,
in which ®z is a random vector with arbitrary distribution with no
positive probability mass in any proper linear subspace. For any
i ∈ X1, node i is only connected to node i + k . Since θi = B and
θk+i = zi for a random variable zi , θi − θk+i , B almost surely. So
in order for the flow equations to hold, either both i, i + k ∈ H0
or i + k ∈ H0. The same argument holds for any node j ∈ Y1 and
its only neighbor j − 3k . So in order for the problem to have a
solution, H0 should contain both X2 and Y2. On the other hand,
since |VH0 | ≤ |V |/2, therefore H0 = G[X2 ∪ Y2] = H is the only
possible attacked area. Now since H0 = H , we can assume that the
attacked area is given and the rest of the proof is exactly similar to
the proof of Lemma 4.5. □
Corollary 4.8. Given A, ®θ , and ®θ⋆, it is strongly NP-hard to find
a subgraph H , a set of line failures F in H , and a vector ®θ ′H such that
A®θ = A′
[ ®θ ′H
®θ⋆
H¯
]
, even if such H , F exist.
Corollary 4.8 indicates that it is NP-hard to detect the line failures
after an attack as described in Section 3 in general cases. However,
in the next sections, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to
detect the attacked area H and the set of line failures F , and show
based on simulations that it performs well in reasonable scenarios.
5 ATTACKED AREA APPROXIMATION
In this section, we provide methods to approximate the attacked
area after a cyber attack as described in Subsection 3.2. In subsec-
tions 5.1 and 5.2, we first provide methods to contain the attacked
area after the data distortion and replay attacks, respectively. We
then combine these methods in the ATtacked Area Containment
(ATAC) Module for containing the attacked area after both types of
data attacks. Finally, given an area containing the attacked area, in
subsection 5.4, we provide methods to improve the approximation
of the attacked area.
5.1 Data Distortion
We first consider data distortion attacks. In particular, recall that we
assume that ®θ⋆H = ®θ ′H + ®z for a random vector ®z with an arbitrary
distribution with no positive probability mass in any proper linear
subspace. Since ®θ⋆H is the vector of the modified phase angles and
there are also some line failures in H , it can be seen that A®θ⋆ , ®p.
Lemma 5.1. For any i ∈ int(H¯ ), Ai ®θ⋆ = pi .
Proof. Since i ∈ int(H¯ ), therefore ai j = 0 for all j ∈ VH . Hence,
Ai ®θ⋆ = Ai |H¯ ®θ⋆H¯ . On the other hand, since the attack is insideH , we
know Ai |H¯ = A′i |H¯ , and also
®θ⋆
H¯
= ®θ ′¯
H
. Hence, Ai ®θ⋆ = Ai |H¯ ®θ⋆H¯ =
A′
i |H¯
®θ ′¯
H
= pi . □
Lemma 5.2. For any i ∈V \int(H¯ ), Ai ®θ⋆,pi almost surely.
Proof. For any i ∈ V \int(H¯ ), there exists a node j ∈ VH such
that ai j , 0. Now since the set of solutions ®x to Ai ®x = pi is a
measure zero set in Rn and θ⋆j is a random modification of θ
′
j ,
Ai ®θ⋆ , pi almost surely. □
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that given A, ®θ , and ®θ⋆ one can find
int(H¯ ) by computing V \supp(A®θ⋆ − ®p).
Corollary 5.3. int(H¯ )=V \supp(A®θ⋆−®p), almost surely.
Define S0 := G[supp(A®θ⋆ − ®p )]. We know from Corollary 5.3
that int(H¯ ) = VS¯0 and from Lemma 5.2 that VH ⊂ VS0 . Therefore,
S0 clearly contains H . The following lemma demonstrates that
int(S0) is a better approximation for VH . We use this lemma in
Subsection 5.4 to improve the approximation of the attacked area.
Lemma 5.4. VH ⊆ int(S0), almost surely.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists a node i ∈ VH such that
N (i) ∩ VS¯0 , ∅. Assume j ∈ N (i) ∩ VS¯0 , ∅, then with a similar
argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.2, one can show that Aj ®θ⋆ ,
pj almost surely, which contradicts with j < VS0 . Hence,N (i)∩VS¯0 =∅ and VH ⊆ int(S0). □
5.2 Data Replay
In this subsection, we consider data replay attacks. Recall that
we assume ®θ⋆H = ®θ ′′H such that ®θ ′′ satisfies A®θ ′′ = ®p ′′. The power
supply/demand vector ®p ′′ is arbitrarily selected such that ®p ′′H = ®pH ,
and ®p ′′¯
H
is selected generally enough.
The data replay attacks are harder to detect since the data seems
to be correct locally. Again, one can easily see that A®θ⋆ , ®p, but
here unlike the data distortion case, not all the nodes in H can
be detected by checking Ai ®θ⋆ , pi . The following lemma shows
why attacked area containment is more difficult after a data replay
attack.
Lemma 5.5. For any i ∈ int(H ) ∪ int(H¯ ), Ai ®θ⋆ = pi .
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, it is easy to show
that for any i ∈ int(H¯ ), Ai ®θ⋆ = pi . The only new part is to show
the same for nodes in int(H ). So assume i ∈ int(H ), following the
definition of the interior, it can be verified that Ai ®θ⋆ = Ai |H ®θ⋆H .
On the other hand, since ®θ⋆H = ®θ ′′H and ®p ′′H = ®pH , we can verify
that Ai |H ®θ⋆H = Ai |H ®θ ′′H = p′′i = pi . Hence, for all i ∈ int(H ) also
Ai ®θ⋆ = pi . □
Lemma 5.6. For any i ∈ ∂(H ) ∪ ∂(H¯ ), Ai ®θ⋆ , pi , almost surely.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.2.
For any i ∈ ∂(H¯ ), there exists a node j ∈ VH such that ai j , 0. Now
since the set of solutions ®x to Ai ®x = pi is a measure zero set in Rn
and θ⋆j = θ
′′
j for a generally enough selected vector p
′′¯
H
, Ai ®θ⋆ , pi
almost surely. A similar argument holds for i ∈ ∂(H ). □
Corollary 5.7. supp(A®θ⋆ − ®p ) = ∂(H ) ∪ ∂(H¯ ), almost surely.
From comparing Corollaries 5.3 and 5.7, one can see that in the
replay attack case, S0 = G[supp(A®θ⋆ − ®p )] does not contain the
attacked area H anymore. In the following lemma, we show how
one can still contain the attacked area in this case.
Lemma 5.8. If C1,C2, . . . ,Ck are the connected components of
G\S0, then these connected components can be divided into two dis-
joint sets {i1, i2, . . . , is } and {j1, j2, . . . , jt } such that G[int(H )] =
Ci1 ∪Ci2 ∪ · · · ∪Cis and G[int(H¯ )] = Cj1 ∪Cj2 ∪ · · · ∪Cjt .
Proof. It is a direct result of Corollary 5.7. □
Lemma 5.9. For two connected components Ci and Cj of G\S0, if
N (Ci )∩N (Cj ) , ∅, then eitherCi ∪Cj ⊆ int(H ) orCi ∪Cj ⊆ int(H¯ ).
Proof. From Lemma 5.8, for any i , either Ci ⊆ G[int(H¯ )] or
Ci ⊆ G[int(H )]. If Ci ⊆ G[int(H¯ )] then N (Ci ) ⊆ ∂(H¯ ), and if
Ci ⊆ G[int(H )] then N (Ci ) ⊆ ∂(H ). Hence, since ∂(H¯ ) ∩ ∂(H ) = ∅,
if N (Ci ) ∩ N (Cj ) , ∅, then either Ci ∪ Cj ⊆ int(H ) or Ci ∪ Cj ⊆
int(H¯ ). □
Following Lemma 5.9, one can see that connected components
C1,C2, . . . ,Ck can be combined into disjoint subgraphs G1,
G2, . . . ,Gt such that for any two of these subgraphs such asGi and
G j , N (Gi ) ∩ N (G j ) = ∅. Moreover for any i , either Gi ⊆ G[int(H )]
or Gi ⊆ G[int(H¯ )]. In the following lemma, we use this fact to
contain the attacked area.
Lemma 5.10. There exists 1 ≤ i ≤ t , such that H ⊂ G\Gi . More-
over, H ⊆ G[int(G\Gi )].
Proof. The first part of the proof is the direct result of Lem-
mas 5.8 and 5.9. To prove the second part, notice that for any i ,
S0 ⊂ G\Gi . Therefore, for any i , ∂(H¯ ) ⊂ G\Gi . Hence, ifH ⊂ G\Gi ,
since ∂(H¯ ) ⊂ G\Gi , one can verify that H ⊆ G[int(G\Gi )]. □
Lemma 5.10 demonstrates that at least one of G\Gi contains the
attacked area. Hence, one can use this fact to contain the attacked
area after a data replay attack.
𝑆0
𝐺2 𝐺1
𝐻1
𝐻2𝐺
Figure 2: An ambiguous scenario. Both a data replay attack
on the attacked area H1 or a data distortion attack on the
attacked area H2 result in the same S0 = G[supp(A®θ⋆ − ®p)].
Module 1: ATtacked Area Containment (ATAC)
Input: G , A, ®θ , and ®θ⋆
1: Compute ®p = A ®θ
2: Compute S0 = G[supp(A ®θ⋆ − ®p)]
3: Find the connected components C1, C2, . . . , Ck of G\S0
4: Using Lemma 5.9, combine the connected components with common
neighbors to obtain G1, . . . , Gt (sorted based on their size from
largest to smallest)
5: Return S0, S1 := G\G1, S2 := G\G2, . . . , St := G\Gt
5.3 The ATAC Module
Using the results in the previous subsections, here we introduce
the ATtacked Area Containment (ATAC) Module for containing
the attacked area after both types of data attacks. The main chal-
lenge is to distinguish between the two data attacks. As shown in
Fig. 2, there are scenarios for which the data attack type cannot
be recognized by simply looking at S0. Hence, the ATAC Module
does not return a single subgraph containing the attacked area but
a series of possible subgraphs. In Sections 6 and 7, we show that by
defining the confidence of the solution, an algorithm can go over all
of these subgraphs until it detects the attacked area and the set of
line failures with high confidence.
The steps of the ATAC Module are summarized in Module 1. As
can be seen, S0 is the first possible subgraph returned by the ATAC
module, which is for the case when there is a data distortion attack.
Then based on Lemma 5.10, S1 := G\G1, S2 := G\G2, . . . , St :=
G\Gt are other possible areas containing the attacked area, if there
is a replay attack. Notice that since t < |V |, therefore the ATAC
module is a polynomial time algorithm.
5.4 Improving Attacked Area Approximation
Assume that from the subgraphs returned by the ATAC Module,
S∗ is one of them that contains the attacked area H . Following
Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.10, Sa := G[int(S∗)] is a better approxi-
mation for the attacked area H . In order to find a more accurate
approximation for H , we provide the following lemma which is
similar to [30, Lemma 1].
Lemma 5.11. For a subgraph S , if VH ⊆ VS , then:
AS¯ |G ( ®θ − ®θ ′) = 0. (4)
Proof. Since all the line failures are inside H , and alsoVH ⊆ VS ,
therefore it can be seen that AS¯ |G = A′¯S |G . On the other hand,
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Figure 3: H is an induced subgraph of G that represents the
attacked area with data distortion attack. The red, orange,
and yellow nodes represent the nodes in Sb , Sa\Sb , and S∗\Sa ,
respectively.
AS¯ |G ®θ = ®pS¯ and A′¯S |G ®θ ′ = ®pS¯ . Hence, AS¯ |G ®θ − A′¯S |G ®θ ′ = 0 and
therefore AS¯ |G ( ®θ − ®θ ′) = 0. □
Lemma 5.11 can be effectively used to estimate the phase angle
of the nodes in S and to detect the attacked area H using these
estimated values. The idea is to break (4) into parts that are known
and unknown as follows:
AS¯ |S¯ ( ®θS¯ − ®θ ′¯S ) + AS¯ |S ( ®θS − ®θ ′S ).
Notice that since VH ⊆ VS , therefore ®θ ′¯S = ®θ⋆S¯ . Hence, the only
unknown variable in the equation above is ®θ ′S . Assume ®y ∈ R |VS |
is a solution to the following equation:
AS¯ |S ®y = AS¯ |S¯ ( ®θS¯ − ®θ⋆S¯ ) + AS¯ |S ®θS . (5)
In the following lemma, we demonstrate that supp(®y − ®θ⋆S ) can be
used to estimate H .
Lemma 5.12. If ®y is a solution to (5), VH ⊆ supp(®y − ®θ⋆S ), almost
surely.
Proof. Since ®θ⋆H is selected generally enough (for both the data
distortion and replay attacks) for any i ∈ H , the only way yi = θ⋆i
satisfying (5) is that AS¯ |i = 0. In that case any yi ∈ R satisfies
(5). So the set of solutions ®y such that yi = θ⋆i is a measure zero
set and yi , θ⋆i almost surely. Hence, VH ⊆ supp(®y − ®θ⋆S ), almost
surely. □
Following Lemma 5.12, if ®y is a solution to (5) for S = Sa , then
Sb := G[supp(®y − ®θ⋆Sa )] is a better approximation for the attacked
area H . Fig. 3 shows the difference between S∗, Sa , and Sb in ap-
proximating the attacked area for the case of a distortion attack.
Finally, the following lemma demonstrates when Sb is exactly
equal to H .
Lemma 5.13. For a subgraph S such that VH ⊆ VS , if VS \VH ⊆
∂(S) and there is a matching between the nodes in S¯ and ∂(S) that
covers all the nodes in ∂(S), thenG[supp(®y − ®θ⋆S )] = H , in which ®y is
the solution to (5).
Proof. If there is a matching between the nodes inside and
outside of H that covers all the nodes in ∂(S), one can prove that
AS¯ |∂(S ) has linearly independent columns, almost surely (see [30,
Corollary 2]). Moreover, it is easy to see that AS¯ |int(S ) = 0. Hence,
if ®y is a solution to (5), y∂(H ) = ®θ ′∂(H ). Now since VS \VH ⊆ ∂(S),
for any i in VS \VH , yi = θ ′i = θ⋆i . On the other hand, since ®θ⋆H
are selected generally enough, one can verify that for any i ∈ H ,
yi , ®θ⋆i , almost surely. Therefore, G[supp(®y − ®θ⋆S )] = H , almost
surely. □
6 LINE FAILURES DETECTION
In the previous section, we provided methods to find a good ap-
proximation S for the attacked area H . In this section, we provide
a method to detect line failures inside S . For this reason, we use
and build on the idea introduced in [30]. It was proved in [30] that
if the attacked area H is known, then there always exists feasible
vectors ®x ∈ R |EH | and ®y ∈ R |VH | satisfying the conditions of the
following optimization problem such that supp(®x) = F and ®y = ®θ ′H :
min
®x, ®y
∥ ®x ∥1 s.t.
AH |H ( ®θH − ®y) + AH |H¯ ( ®θH¯ − ®θ ′¯H ) = DH ®x (6)
AH¯ |H ( ®θH − ®y) + AH¯ |H¯ ( ®θH¯ − ®θ ′¯H ) = 0.
Notice that the optimization problem (6) can be solved efficiently
using Linear Program (LP). It is proved in [30] that under some
conditions on H and the set of line failures F , the solution to (6) is
unique, therefore the relaxation is exact and the set of line failures
can be detected by solving (6). In particular, it is proved in [30] that
if H is acyclic and there is a matching between the nodes in H and
H¯ that covers H , the solution to (6) is unique for any set of line
failures.
Since the conditions on H and F as described in [30] may not
always hold for the exactness of the line failures detection using (6),
it cannot be used in general cases to detect line failures. To address
this issue, here, we introduce a randomized version of (6).
Assume thatW ∈ R |ES |× |ES | is a diagonal matrix. We show that
the solution to the following optimization problem can detect line
failures in S accurately for a “good" matrixW:
min
®x, ®y
∥W®x ∥1 s.t.
AS |S ( ®θS − ®y) + AS |S¯ ( ®θS¯ − ®θ ′¯S ) = DS ®x (7)
AS¯ |S ( ®θS − ®y) + AS¯ |S¯ ( ®θS¯ − ®θ ′¯S ) = 0.
The idea behind optimizing the weighted norm-1 of vector ®x is to
be able to detect the line failures when the solution to (6) does not
detect the correct set of line failures but a small disturbance results
in the correct detection.
Before we demonstrate the effectiveness of the optimization (7)
in detecting line failures, we provide a metric for measuring the
confidence of a solution. In a subgraph S , assume F† = supp(®x)
and ®θ †S = ®y are the set of detected line failures and the recovered
phase angles using the solution to (7). Also assume that A† is
the admittance matrix after removing the lines in F† and define
®p † := AG |S¯ ®θ ′¯S + A
†
G |S ®θ
†
S . Notice that ®x and ®y satisfying (7) does
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Module 2: LIne Failures Detection (LIFD)
Input: G , A, ®θ , S , T , and ®θ⋆
1: Compute ®p = A ®θ
2: Compute a solution ®x, ®y to (7) forW = I
3: Set F † = supp( ®x ) and ®θ †S = ®y
4: while c(F †, ®θ †S ) < 99.99% & counter<T do
5: counter++
6: Draw random numbers w1, w2, . . . , w |VS | from an exponential
distribution with rate λ = 1
7: Compute a solution ®x, ®y to (7) forW = diag(w1, w2, . . . , w |VS |)
8: Set F † = supp( ®x ) and ®θ †S = ®y
9: if c(F †, ®θ †S ) > 99.99% then
10: return F †, ®θ †S
11: else
12: return F †, ®θ †S with maximum c(F †, ®θ †S ) in all iterations
not necessarily imply ®p † = ®p . Hence, one can use this difference to
compute the confidence of a solution as follows.
Definition 6.1. The confidence of the solution is denoted by c(F†, ®θ †S )
and defined as:
c(F†, ®θ †S ) := (1 − ∥®p † − ®p∥2/∥ ®p∥2)+ × 100, (8)
in which (z)+ := max(0, z).
The confidence of the solution along with a random selection
of the weight matrix W in (7) can be used to detect line failures
that cannot be detected using (6). The idea is to repeatedly solve (7)
using a random weight matrix until the confidence of the solution
for F† = supp(®x) and ®θ †S = ®y is 100% or reach a maximum number
of iterations (T ). Here, we consider the case when the diagonal
entries of matrix W are randomly selected from an exponential
distribution. This approach is summarized in Module 2 as the LIne
Failures Detection (LIFD) Module.
Through the rest of this section, we demonstrate why the LIFD
Module is effective and when the number of iterations (T ) is enough
to be polynomial in terms of the input size to make sure that it finds
the line failures accurately.
Lemma 6.2. Assumew1,w2, . . . ,wm are i.i.d. exponential random
variables, then for 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1:
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) =
∑m−1
j=k
(m−1
j
)
2m−1
.
Proof. See Section 10. □
Corollary 6.3. Assumew1,w2, . . . ,wm are i.i.d. exponential ran-
dom variables, then for k ≤ m/2 + Θ(√m):
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) = Ω( 1√
m
).
Proof. See Section 10. □
Lemma 6.4. If S = H , H is a cycle withm nodes and edges, and
there is a matching between the nodes inside and outside of H that
covers all the inside nodes, then any set of line failures of size k can be
found by the LIFD Module for expectedly T = 2m−1/(∑m−1j=k (m−1j )).
Moreover, if k ≤ m/2 + Θ(√m), then LIFD Module can detect line
failures for T = O(√m).
Proof. First, one can see that if S = H , and there is a matching
between the nodes inside and outside of H that covers all the inside
nodes, then AS¯ |S = AH¯ |H has uniquely independent columns,
almost surely [30, Corollary 2]. Hence, the solution ®y to (7) is unique
and ®y = ®θ ′H . Therefore, we can assume that ®θ ′ is given. Without
loss of generality assume that F = {e1, . . . , ek }. We prove that the
solution ®x to (7) is unique and supp(®x) = F , if∑ki=1wi < ∑mi=k+1wi ,
in whichW = diag(w1, . . . ,wm ).
Without loss of generality, assume that DH is the incidence matrix
of H when lines of H are oriented clockwise. Since H is connected,
it is known that rank(DH ) = m − 1 [5, Theorem 2.2]. Therefore,
dim(Null(DH )) = 1. Suppose ®z ∈ R |EH | is the all one vector. It
can be verified that DH ®z = 0. Since dim(Null(DH )) = 1, ®z forms
a basis for the null space of D. Now suppose ®x† is a solution to
AH |G ( ®θ − ®θ ′) = DH ®x such that supp(®x†) = F (from [30, Lemma
2], we know that such a solution exists). Since ®z forms a basis
for Null(D), all other solutions of AH |G ( ®θ − ®θ ′) = DH ®x can be
written in the form of ®x† + c®z. We want to prove that if ∑ki=1wi <∑m
i=k+1wi , then for any c ∈ R\{0}, ∥W®x†∥1 < ∥W(®x† + c®z)∥1.
Since supp(®x†) = F , x†1 ,x†2 , . . . ,x†k are the only nonzero elements
of ®x†. MoreoverWd :=
∑m
i=k+1wi −
∑k
i=1wi > 0. Hence,
∥W(®x† + c®z)∥1 =
k∑
i=1
wi |x†i − c | + |c |
m∑
i=k+1
wi
=
k∑
i=1
wi (|x†i − c | + |c |) + |c |Wd
≥
k∑
i=1
wi |x†i | + |c |Wd >
k∑
i=1
wi |x†i | = ∥W®x†∥1.
Therefore, the solution ®x to (7) is unique and supp(®x) = F , if∑k
i=1wi <
∑m
i=k+1wi . One the other hand, fromLemma 6.2, Pr (
∑k
i=1wi <∑m
i=k+1wi ) =
∑m−1
j=k (m−1j )
2m−1 . Hence, expectedly
2m−1∑m−1
j=k (m−1j ) number
of iterations (T ) should be enough to satisfy this inequality. Corol-
lary 6.3 also gives the expected number of iterations needed when
k ≤ m/2 + Θ(√m). □
Lemma 6.4 clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of using a
weight matrixW in (7). It was previously proved in [30] that if H
is a cycle and there is a matching between the nodes inside and
outside of H that covers all the inside nodes, then for any set of
line failures of size less than half of the lines in H , supp(®x) of the
solution ®x to (6) exactly reveals the set of line failures. However,
for the line failures with the size more than half of the lines in H ,
this approach comes short. In these cases, Lemma 6.4 indicates that
solving (7) for random matricesW for polynomial number of times
can lead to the correct detection.
Although providing a similar analytical bound for T to ensure
detecting line failures in general cases is very difficult, in Section 8,
we numerically show that small values ofT is enough to detect line
failures in more complex attacked areas as well.
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Algorithm 1: REcurrent Attack Containment and deTection
(REACT)
Input: G , A, ®θ , ®θ⋆, and T
1: Compute ®p = A ®θ
2: Obtain S0, S1, . . . , St using the ATAC Module
3: for i = 1 to t do
4: Compute Sa = G[int(Si )]
5: if (5) is feasible for S = Sa then
6: Find a solution ®y to (5) for S = Sa
7: else
8: continue
9: Compute Sb = G[supp( ®y − ®θ⋆S )]
10: Set S = Sb as an approximation for the attacked area H
11: Compute a solution ®x, ®y to (7) forW = I
12: Set F † = supp( ®x ) and ®θ †S = ®y
13: if c(F †, ®θ †S ) < 99.99% then
14: Obtain F †, ®θ †S from module LIFD for inputs S and T
15: if c(F †, ®θ †S ) > 99.99% then
16: return H = supp( ®θ †S − ®θ ⋆S ) as the detected attacked area and
F †, ®θ †H as the detected line failures and recovered phase angle of
the nodes inside H
17: return S and F †, ®θ †S with maximum c(F †, ®θ †S ) in all iterations
7 REACT ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the REcurrent Attack Containment and
deTection (REACT) Algorithm based on the results presented in the
previous sections. The steps of the REACT Algorithm are summa-
rized in Algorithm 1.
The REACT Algorithm first obtains a set of possible subgraphs
S0, S1, . . . , St that may contain the attacked areaH using the ATAC
Module. Then, for each subgraph Si using the results in Subsec-
tion 5.4, it improves the approximation of the attacked area. In
particular, it first computes Sa = G[int(Si )] and then finds a solu-
tion to (5) for S = Sa . If (5) is not feasible, then it means that Si
does not contain the attacked area H , and therefore, the algorithm
goes to the next iteration and tries the next possible subgraph. If (5)
has a feasible solution ®y, it obtains a better approximation of the
attacked area H by computing Sb = G[supp(®y − ®θ⋆S )] (Lemma 5.12).
Then, it solves the optimization (7) forW = I, in which I is the
identity matrix. Notice that this is basically similar to solving (6).
Then it checks the confidence of the solution c(F†, ®θ †S ). If it is less
than 99.99%, it calls the LIFD Module to obtain another solution
F†, ®θ †S . Finally, it checks whether the confidence of the solution is
c(F†, ®θ †S ) > 99.99%. If so, it approximates the attacked areaH using
this solution and returns F†, ®θ †H .
If the REACT Algorithm cannot find a solution with confidence
greater than 99.99%, it returns a solution with the highest confi-
dence between all the solutions obtained in all the iterations.
Notice that the REACT Algorithm is a polynomial time algo-
rithm. Therefore, it cannot return the correct solution to an NP-hard
problem in all cases. However, in the next section we numerically
demonstrate that it performs very well in reasonable settings.
8 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the REACT Algo-
rithm in detecting the attacked area and recovering the information
after a cyber attack as described in Section 3.2. We consider two
attacked areas H1 and H2 within the IEEE 300-bus system [2] as
depicted in Fig. 4. H1 has 15 nodes and 16 edges, and H2 which con-
tains H1, has 31 nodes and 41 edges. It can be verified that none of
these two subgraphs are acyclic and there is no matching between
the nodes inside and outside of these two subgraphs that covers
their insides nodes. Hence, the methods provided in [30] cannot re-
cover the information inside these areas even when the attacked areas
are known in advance.
For the physical part of the attack, we consider all single line
failures, and 100 samples of all double and triple line failures within
H1 and H2. Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate the REACT Algorithm’s perfor-
mance after these attacks. In the Algorithm, we set T = 20 so that
the while loop in the LIFD Module runs only for 20 iterations.
Fig. 6 shows the performance of the REACT Algorithm in de-
tecting the attacked area and recovering the information after data
distortion and data replay attacks on the attacked area H1 accom-
panied by single, double, and triple line failures. As can be seen in
Fig. 6(a), the REACT Algorithm can exactly detect the attacked area
after all attack scenarios under both the distortion attack and the
replay attack. Hence, the performance of the REACT Algorithm is
almost the same in detecting line failures and recovering the phase
angles after both data attack scenarios.
Fig. 6(b) shows the average number of False Negatives (FN) and
False Positives (FP) in detecting line failures. As can be seen, the
REACT Algorithm can detect line failures with very low average
number of FNs and FPs. Moreover, as it is shown in Fig. 6(c), the
REACT Algorithm exactly detects single, double, and triple line
failures in 94%, 87%, and 82% of the cases, respectively.
Fig. 6(d) shows the average running time of the REACT Algo-
rithm in detecting all attacked scenarios in this case. Our system
has an Intel Core i7-2600 3.40GHz CPU and 16GB RAM. One can
see that the running time of the REACT Algorithm is very low. The
average confidence of the solutions are also shown in Fig. 6(e). As
can be seen, despite few false negatives and positives in detect-
ing line failures, the solutions obtained by the REACT Algorithm
have very high confidence which means that the REACT Algorithm
barely missed finding the correct solution.
Finally, Fig. 6(f) shows the average percentage error in the re-
covered phase angles. It can be seen that the phase angles inside
the attacked area can be recovered with less than 3%, 5%, and 7%
error after the single, double, and triple line failures, respectively.
As we observed in Fig. 6, when the attacked area is relatively
small, the REACT Algorithm performs very similarly after the two
types of data attack. However, as it can be clearly seen in Fig. 7, it is
not the case as the attacked area becomes larger. Before we analyze
the results provided in Fig. 7, in order to better show the difficulty of
detecting the attacked area after a data replay attack, we depicted in
Fig. 5 one of the analyzed attacked scenarios in Fig. 7. As can be seen
in Fig. 5(a), the REACT Algorithm can exactly detect the attacked
area after a data distortion attack on H2 which is accompanied by
a triple line failure. However, it may have difficulties detecting the
attacked area after a data replay attack on the same area with the
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Figure 4: The two attacked areas in the IEEE 300-bus systems that are used in simulations. The red octagon nodes are the nodes
in H1 and H2, and the orange square nodes are the nodes that are only in H2.
(a) Data Distortion Attack (b) Data Replay Attack
Figure 5: The difference in difficulty of detecting the attacked area after a data distortion attack and a data replay attack on the
attacked area H2 accompanied by a triple line failure within H2. The yellow filled nodes represent the nodes in the detected
attacked area by the REACT Algorithm, the nodes with a thick red border represent the nodes inH2 that are actually attacked,
and blue empty nodes represent the rest of the nodes.
same set of line failures. Recall from Subsection 5.2 that the main
reason for this is the difficulty of distinguishing between the nodes
in int(H ) and int(H¯ ).
Fig. 7(a) shows the extra nodes that are incorrectly detected by
the REACT Algorithm as part of the attacked area. As can be seen,
in the case of the data distortion attack, the number of line failures
do not significantly affect the performance of the REACTAlgorithm.
However, in the case of the replay attack, as the number of line
failures within the attacked area increases, the REACT Algorithm
provides less accurate approximation of the attacked area.
Despite its difficulty in detecting the attacked area after a data
replay attack, Figs. 7(b) and 7(c) demonstrate that the REACT Al-
gorithm detects the line failures relatively accurately. For example,
the REACT Algorithm accurately detects the single and double line
failures in 95% and 65% of the cases, respectively.
As can be seen in Fig. 7(d), the running time of the REACT Algo-
rithm increases as the size of the attacked area increases. However,
it still detects line failures much faster than existing brute force
methods [32, 33, 38–40] (to the best of our knowledge there are no
methods for detecting the attacked area).
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Figure 6: The REACT Algorithm’s performance in detecting
the attacked area and recovering the information after data
distortion and replay attacks on the attacked areaH1 accom-
panied by single, double, and triple line failures. (a) Average
number of extra nodes detected as attacked in detecting the
attacked area, (b) average number of false positives and neg-
atives in detecting line failures, (c) percentage of the cases
with exact line failures detection, (d) running time of the al-
gorithm, (e) average confidence of the solutions, and (f) av-
erage error in recovered phase angles.
Similar to the previous attack scenario, one can see in Fig. 7(e)
that the confidence of the solutions obtained by the REACT Algo-
rithm are very high. It means that in these attack scenarios, many
good solutions exist near the optimal solution. This demonstrates
another difficulty of dealing with recovery of information after a
cyber attack on the power grid.
Finally, Fig. 7(f) indicates that the REACT Algorithm performs
very well in recovering the phase angles in this case as well. As
can be seen, for both the data distortion and the data replay attacks
accompanied by single, double, and triple line failures, the REACT
Algorithm recovers the phase angles with less than 5% error.
Overall, the simulation results in this section demonstrate that
the REACT Algorithm performs very well in detecting the attacked
area and the line failures when the attacked area is relatively small.
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Figure 7: The REACT Algorithm’s performance in detecting
the attacked area and recovering the information after data
distortion and replay attacks on the attacked areaH2 accom-
panied by single, double, and triple line failures. (a) Average
number of extra nodes detected as attacked in detecting the
attacked area, (b) average number of false positives and neg-
atives in detecting line failures, (c) percentage of the cases
with exact line failures detection, (d) running time of the al-
gorithm, (e) average confidence of the solutions, and (f) av-
erage error in recovered phase angles.
As the attacked area becomes larger, the Algorithm still performs
very well in detecting the attacked area after a distortion data attack.
However, it may face difficulties providing an accurate approxima-
tion of the attacked area after a replay attack. Despite this, in both
data attack scenarios, it detects line failures relatively well. One of
the important observations in this section is that the LIFD module
outperforms the methods provided in [30] for detecting line failures
with an slight increase in the running time, since it needs to find
a solution to (7) several times instead of once. The results in this
section clearly demonstrate that in the attacked areas H1 and H2
that do not have the conditions provided [30], the LIFD Module can
still detect the line failures relatively accurately with less than 20
iterations. In most of theses cases, the LIFD Module detects the line
failures within much fewer number of iterations.
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9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a model for cyber attacks on power
grids focusing on both data distortion and data reply attacks. We
proved that the problem of detecting the line failures after such an
attack is NP-hard in general and even when the attacked area is
known. However, using the algebraic properties of the DC power
flows, we developed the polynomial time REACT Algorithm for
approximating the attacked area and detecting the line failures after
a cyber attack on the grid. We numerically showed that the REACT
Algorithm obtains accurate results when there are few number
of line failures and the attacked area is small. We showed that as
the attacked area becomes larger and the number of line failures
increases, the REACT Algorithm faces some difficulties but still
can approximate the attacked area and detect line failures with few
false negatives and positives.
We analytically and numerically showed that the data replay
attacks are harder to deal with than the data distortion attacks. It
is possible for an adversary to devise more sophisticated attacks
to further obscure the system’s state. Studying more sophisticated
attacks and improving the methods to protect the grid against such
attacks is part of our future work. Moreover, since the DC power
flows only provide an approximation for the more accurate AC
power flows, we plan to extend our methods to function under the
AC power flow model as well.
10 APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Define sk :=
∑k
i=1wi . It is known that
fsk (x) =
λe−λx (λx)k−1
(k − 1)! .
Now since wi s are i.i.d. random variables,
∑m
i=k+1wi ∼ sm−k .
Therefore, all we need to compute is Pr (sk < sm−k ).
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr (sm−k − sk = a) da
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Pr (sk = y)Pr (sm−k = y + a) dy da
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
λe−λy (λy)k−1
(k − 1)!
λe−λ(y+a)(λ(y + a))m−k−1
(m − k − 1)! dy da
=
∫ ∞
0
λme−2λyyk−1
(k − 1)!(m − k − 1)!
(∫ ∞
0
e−λa (y + a)(m−k−1)da
)
dy. (9)
On the other hand, by defining z := λ(y + a), we have:∫ ∞
0
e−λa (y + a)(m−k−1)da = e
λy
λm−k
∫ ∞
λy
e−zzm−k−1 dz.
Define T (n + 1) :=
∫ ∞
λy e
−zzn dz. Using partial integration:
T (n + 1) = [−e−zzn ]∞λy + ∫ ∞
λy
nzn−1e−z dz
= e−λy (λy)n + nT (n) = n!e−λy
n∑
i=0
(λy)i
i! .
Using equation above in (9) results in:
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) =
∫ ∞
0
λne−2λyyk−1
(k − 1)!(m − k − 1)!
eλy
λm−k
T (m − k)
=
λk
(k − 1)!
∫ ∞
0
e−2λyyk−1
(m−k−1∑
i=0
(λy)i
i!
)
dy
=
λk
(k − 1)!
m−k−1∑
i=0
( ∫ ∞
0
e−2λyyk−1 (λy)
i
i! dy
)
.
By defining x := 2λy and using Gamma function:
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) = λ
k
(k − 1)!
m−k−1∑
i=0
( λ−k
i!2i+k
∫ ∞
0
e−xxk+i−1 dx
)
=
λk
(k − 1)!
m−k−1∑
i=0
( λ−k
i!2i+k
(k + i − 1)!
)
=
m−k−1∑
i=0
2−i−k
(
k + i − 1
i
)
= 2−(m−1)
m−k−1∑
i=0
2(m−1)−(i+k )
(
k + i − 1
k − 1
)
.
(10)
Now notice that
∑m−k−1
i=0 2
(m−1)−(i+k ) (k+i−1
i
)
is equal to the total
number of subsets of {1, . . . ,m − 1} with at least k elements. The
reason is that this summation is equal to the total number of subsets
that contain k+i and exactly k−1 elements from {1, 2, . . . ,k+i−1}.
It is easy to verify that by summing this up on i , we count all the
subsets of {1, . . . ,m−1}with at least k elements. On the other hand,
we can count the total number of subsets of {1, . . . ,m − 1} with
at least k elements using the complement rule. The total number
of subsets with at least k elements is equal to the total number of
subsets minus number of subsets of size 0,1,. . . ,k − 1. Hence,
m−k−1∑
i=0
2(m−1)−(i+k )
(
k + i − 1
k − 1
)
= 2m−1 −
k−1∑
i=0
(
m − 1
j
)
.
Now using the equation above in (10) and using the equality 2m−1 =∑m−1
i=0
(m−1
j
)
, proves the lemma. □
Proof of Corollary 6.3. It is easy to see that if k ≤ (m − 1)/2,
then
∑m−1
j=k
(m−1
j
) ≥ 2m−2. Therefore fromLemma 6.2, Pr (∑ki=1wi <∑m
i=k+1wi ) ≥ 1/2 and there is nothing left to prove. So assume
k = m/2 + Θ(√m). It is proved in [25, Lemma 10.8] that for any
1/2 < α < 1,
2nH(α )√
8nα(1 − α)
≤
n∑
j=αn
(
n
k
)
,
in which H(α) = −α log2(α) − (1 − α) log2(1 − α) is the entropy
function. Now to prove Corollary 6.3, selectn =m−1, and α = 1/2+
ϵ for ϵ = Θ(1/√n). First notice that one can show that the Taylor
expansion of the entropy function around 1/2 can be computed as:
H(α) = 1 − 12 ln 2
∞∑
i=1
(1 − 2α)2i
i(2i − 1) .
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Using approximation above, it is easy to see thatH(α) ≈ 1−Θ(ϵ2) =
1 − Θ(1/n). Hence, 2nH(α ) = 2n−Θ(1). On the other hand,√
8nα(1 − α) =
√
8n(1/2 + ϵ)(1/2 − ϵ) =
√
8n(1/4 − ϵ2)
=
√
2n − Θ(1) ≈ Θ(√n).
Hence, by replacing n bym−1 and using Lemma 6.2, one can verify:
Pr (
k∑
i=1
wi <
m∑
i=k+1
wi ) = Ω( 1√
m
).
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